








Kamikazes and Cultural Evolution
INTRODUCTION
It has been noted that social science lacks a unifying theoretical structure.  There is no consensus about whether its explanatory targets are individuals or aggregates, nor is there an accepted set of general explanatory principles, nor even agreement about whether its aims should be interpretive and normative, or strictly predictive and descriptive (Rosenberg 2008, pp.6, 24).  Some suggest that progress depends on incorporating evolutionary ideas, such as natural selection, into models of cultural change.  Perhaps, with apologies to Dobzhansky, it should be said that culture is unintelligible except in light of evolution.  One articulation of this idea treats culture as a kind of shadow cast by our genes.​[1]​  Then there are those who see cultural change as an autonomous process that has broken free from biology, though operating according to Darwinian principles (Ghirlanda et al. 2006; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1988; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).  A key motivation for this latter view turns on the fact that human beings seem to often help each other even when they don’t stand to gain anything.  Acts that are genuinely altruistic—characterized as those that cannot be explained in terms of either reciprocity or benefits to kin—would seem to be maladaptive.  For this to be so, some wonder, how can Mother Nature’s “leash do any serious constraining?” (Dennett 1999, p.142).
  	Social scientists and philosophers have proposed that cultural evolution can account for behavior that is inexplicable from the point of view of biology alone, especially altruism, “the central theoretical problem” (Wilson 1975, p.3). For many altruistic self-sacrifice is a most compelling example, as killing yourself on behalf of nonrelatives would seem to unambiguously present an action that works against individual biological fitness.  One case in point sometimes highlighted, e.g. by Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Sober (1991/2006), is the phenomenon of kamikaze attacks in wartime Japan.  This example has appeared from time to time in the literature attesting to a special cultural mode of evolution that can counter biology. 
What is at stake is our understanding of the role of culture in shaping social institutions and human behavior.  Though one need only consider the honeybee to see that altruistic self-sacrifice does not require culture, this allows no inference to be drawn about humans, since insects restrict aid to those whom they are very closely related, and, in any case, implementing mechanisms for behavior commonly vary from one species to the next.  So, does the explanation of altruistic suicide in humans require cultural evolution?  I will argue the case for thinking so is actually weakened by a consideration of kamikazes.  In fact, the kamikaze phenomenon can be plausibly dealt with using standard models in human behavioral ecology.  
Though this is only one example, kamikazes are interesting and call for further scrutiny for several reasons: (1) They seem to stand in the way of a general application of biological theory to altruism; (2) It is a showcase example used by many for years starting with Boyd and Richerson and in philosophy, Sober​[2]​; (3) Yet there has been little to no pushback; (4) There is a subgenre developing around the topic of suicidal altruism, though cultural models seem to dominate; (5) The kamikaze phenomenon is especially well-documented though (I think) this would be the first philosophy paper to appraise the details; (6) Its failure to convincingly support cultural models ought to put us on guard when it comes to less extreme varieties of altruism.
To be more specific, if cultural models are favored over biological models, then we would expect to witness it foremost in cases of extreme altruism where the chances of raising biological fitness are minimized.  Kamikazes ought to grab our attention because standard Darwinian mechanisms, i.e. reciprocal altruism and kin selection would not seem to apply—at least initially.  As others have noted (e.g. Orbell and Morikawa 2011, p.5), this means kamikazes seem to stand in the way of a general application of biological models to an understanding of altruism, and indeed this has been the approach of many social scientists and philosophers for decades.
Boyd and Richerson prominently feature kamikazes and they are also showcased in Sober’s “Models of cultural evolution” which appears in what is arguably the leading anthology in the philosophy of biology (and cited at least a hundred times).  The example has been bandied about for years and is ripe for a critical reassessment—does it favor cultural evolution or not?  Most works addressing the theme of suicidal altruism also appear to lean towards cultural models.  Bowles and Ginitis (2011, p.10) treat it as a textbook case, writing that kamikazes are one of several “dramatic examples that people are often motivated by non-selfish principles.”  Orbell and Morikawa (p.3) cite many more examples of scholars who pay little heed to the biological paradigm.  While there is now some awareness in the social sciences, the point does not seem to have been made in philosophy that a biological model explaining kamikazes is possible and even attractive.
To be clear, this paper doesn’t pretend to be a refutation of cultural evolution, rather its more modest aim is to convince the reader that kamikazes can be introduced as a challenge to the prevailing view, namely, that “the prima-facie case for cultural evolutionary theories is irresistible” (Lewens, 2013).  If suicidal altruism doesn’t require cultural evolution, this increases the burden of argument when it comes to lesser forms of sacrifice.
I also concede that one and the same process might be interpretable as cultural, biological, or both.  There might be “multilevel” selection processes (Okasha, 2006) simultaneously involving both biological and cultural units (see also Sober and Wilson 1998, pp.149-50, Richerson et al. 2003, pp.363ff.).  There are also prominent cultural models that do not give a central place to selection over other kinds of processes when it comes to explaining cultural dynamics (Lewins, 2015, pp.15-19).  These differences are important, though the focus here concerns whether there is any cultural rival to biological models, not whether they are specifically invoking selection-like processes.  I argue that biological models are not threatened either way: an explanation mentioning only a cultural process does not enjoy a special explanatory advantage.  Nor do I claim that the ultimate explanation of self-sacrifice is due to a strictly biological adaptation.  Perhaps the explanation of extreme altruism doesn’t directly call on evolutionary theory at all.  
2.  MODELS OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION
How might evolution be significant when it comes to cultural change?  Evolutionary psychology contends that the mechanisms responsible for behavior are biological adaptations (though there are also “spandrels” and side-effects).  The view under consideration here goes further in its commitment to “de-biologicized” modes of evolution, in the sense of non-genetic inheritance mechanisms.  Considering that “[r]umors and diseases exhibit a similar dynamic” (Sober 1991/2006, p.538), perhaps cultural traits, such as beliefs and practices, or to invoke a popular term of art  “memes,”​[3]​ also struggle for existence according to their own Darwinian logic.  Cultural evolution rivals orthodox evolutionary models of behavior insofar as it maintains that cultural factors can “swamp” genetics, and give rise to a new kind of transmission process which has “floated free” from the evolution of genes (Sober 2000, p.220).  Some versions of cultural evolution share evolutionary theory’s adaptationist outlook insofar as (1) Evolution is change in the frequency of traits in a population; (2) Traits superior to their competitors from the standpoint of an ideal engineer tend to become more frequent; and (3) Natural selection is the mechanism of change when frequency changes depend on variation in the fitness of inheritable traits (Sober 2000, p.9).  
Evolution occurs when there is variation, selection, and retention.  An understanding of cultural evolution accordingly might be expected to require concepts such as fitness and heredity be given non-biological interpretations.  In his (1991/2006) Sober distinguishes between two varieties of cultural evolution corresponding to which components of a standard selection process are de-biologicized.  What Sober calls “type-2” and “type-3” processes abandon the assumption that a trait can only be transmitted genetically (type-1 is orthodox biological selection).  A type-2 process incorporates a mix of cultural and biological factors that can reinforce biological fitness, but could also reduce it instead.​[4]​  Meanwhile, a type-3 process has completely broken free from biology, since fitness is also de-biologicized (e.g. in a type-3 process, a belief’s fitness might be equated with its popularity). 
Sober and others suspect that genuine altruism, as with kamikazes, is inexplicable if only a standard (type-1) process is assumed.  Yet “Virtually any behavior can become stable within a social group if it is sufficiently buttressed by social norms” (quoted from Sober and Wilson, 1988, p.151).  In the most general terms, perhaps there is a type-2 process, where those who acquire the kamikaze belief are diminished in biological fitness, working in conjunction with a type-3 process, according to which a cultural evolutionary mechanism spreads a trait, such as being a kamikaze in the minds of the Japanese people.​[5]​  Sober suggests that a process including types 2 and 3 might better explain altruistic self-sacrifice than a type-1 process alone.
3.  THE ACQUISITION PRINCIPLE
Debates internal to cultural evolutionary theory contest how culture is transmitted (Boyd and Richerson 2000, p.151; Sperber 2000, p.172; Claidière and André 2012, p.17).  The meme idea is controversial and, for many, unnecessary.  Some eschew talk of memes, and even selection, proposing instead the “biased” transmission of traits by way of imitative learning and other processes.  For example, Richerson and Boyd (2005) argue that the benefits of being open to influence from peers and acquaintances must outweigh the costs.  However, since it does not always pay to imitate others, individuals need strategies to help them avoid adopting deleterious behaviors.  To solve this problem, they propose learning heuristics, especially “prestige bias” and “learning bias.”  Prestige bias is when individuals tend to favor the behavior of high-status individuals, especially those with a demonstrated record of skill or success in some domain.  Assuming that prestigious individuals are more likely to engage in fitness-enhancing behavior, highly successful individuals are therefore more likely to serve as role models.  Of course, a tendency to emulate the prestigious is not foolproof, but it could still be fitness enhancing.  Meanwhile, conformist bias might drive imitation when a trait is already widely shared, as when a new individual joins an established community.  Once again, the heuristic is not immune to error, but possessing it could also enhance fitness.  In this way, biological selection could prepare the mind to imitate the crowd and the leaders, whether or not any given behavior is in fact adaptive.  
	For my purposes, the specific form cultural evolution takes, whether by memes, selection, imitation, or the various other mechanisms that have been proposed, doesn’t matter, so long as the model fits the commonly utilized epidemic metaphor.  Cultural traits are said to spread analogously to the transmission patterns in disease; a idea catches on by rapidly spreading from one “host” to the next, allowing the trait to fixate in the population.  The fundamental idea is that propagation depends on new hosts having being exposed to a “carrier.”  So it seems that what is fundamental to a population process is the idea of inheritance or propagation, or as Boyd and Richerson put it: “all that is really required is that culture constitutes a system maintaining heritable variation” (Boyd and Richerson 2000, p.158).  What this means is that cultural elements are “transmitted from individual to individual through time” (Ibid. p.154).  Exact replication may not be necessary, but only that “most cultural items are ‘re-produced’ in the sense that they are produced again and again—with, of course, a causal link between all these productions” (Sperber 2000, p.164).  In other words, somehow people “acquire the information necessary to produce a reasonable facsimile of the same behavior” (Boyd and Richerson 2000, p.153).  I take these theorists to be united in thinking that the frequency of a cultural trait must increase the propensity of others to acquire it: “the commonness of a behavior in an individual’s cultural sample must have a positive effect on the probability that the individual ultimately acquires the cultural information that generates the behavior” (Ibid. p.154).  I will refer to this fundamental idea as the Acquisition Principle: for a cultural trait to be heritable in the sense of an evolutionary population process, having it must raise the probability that others will acquire it, whether transmission occurs by selection, instruction, imitation, triggering, memes, or whatever.  In section 5 I will argue that cultural evolution has trouble making sense of this when it comes to self- sacrifice.
4.  OVERLOOKING TYPE-1 MODELS
	Consider Sober’s (1991/2006) explanation of the extreme altruism of suicide pilots.  He assumes (perhaps, as we shall see, rashly) that the kamikaze trait undermined the pilots’ immediate biological fitness, and so demonstrates the power of culture to overwhelm biology.  However, first note that even if the kamikaze trait is bad for the individual, it does not follow that it is deleterious to the fitness of his genes, or the group he​[6]​ belongs to.  What may initially appear to be an exception to biological selection might turn out quite differently upon closer examination.  
A different example making the same point is the famous “demographic-economic paradox,” or the negative correlation between wealth and fertility.  Education, wide availability of birth control, and expanded opportunities for women have been suggested as possible factors for explaining declining family size in developing economies, such as 19th century Italy.  Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) proposed a replicator-based transmission model, which assumes women acquired the desire for smaller families from non-related individuals via “oblique” transmission.  They also argued that women must have been receptive to the new preference even when it was very rare, since otherwise there would have been no general reduction in family size.  If there was something attractive to women about having fewer children, then the trait managed to “overwhelm” biology and “evolve in spite of its Darwinian disutility” (Sober 1991/2006, p.542).  However, this example is not as clinching as philosophers of biology have generally assumed.  
An alternative view offered by Hill and Reeve (2004) sticks to standard type-1 biological selection.  Evolution—specifically optimal clutch size theory—does not predict that organisms will tend to maximize offspring produced in each generation.  Though some organisms (such as many plants and insects) are “type-r” reproducers, emphasizing quantity over quality, others tend to reproduce less often and in smaller numbers.  Such “type-K” reproducers (large mammals for example) make extensive investments in the care of offspring until maturation.  Organisms can also adjust their “strategies” in light of environmental vagaries.  The air of paradox is dispersed once it is recognized that maximizing the fertility of a lineage can sometimes require increased investment in fewer offspring.  Lowered fertility can still be optimal. 
However, Sober dismisses this approach when it comes to humans as “[p]resumably …not even worth exploring” (1991/2006, p.541) since the Italian women could have easily supported more children.  As Sober notes, clutch size theory typically assumes reduced fertility is a response to some environmental pressure, such as limited food or frequent predation of the young, and nothing like this was the case for the wealthy in 19th century Italy.  However, Hill and Reeve ingeniously counter this line by arguing that the required investments spiraled upwards as modernizing economies took flight. 
Their model takes into account the fact that in human societies surplus resources are used to generate more resources instead of just being spent or passed on to offspring.  Early investments can “snowball” into large holdings over time (e.g. paying for Junior to go to the best medical school): “By investing heavily in offspring, wealthy parents can more readily ensure that their offspring can generate more future resources” (Hill and Reeve 2005, p.401).  Game theoretic considerations suggest that where one’s fate is linked to investments for long-term financial stability, there will be a lot of competition with others who are doing the same thing: “By investing heavily in offspring, wealthy parents can more readily ensure that their offspring can generate more future resources” (Ibid.).  As whether holdings are large or small depends on what everybody else has, the result is a financial arms race.  Even seemingly frivolous purchases might be a good bet in the competition to place well in the social hierarchy; let us be reminded that most humans (not just academics) are ruthless status seekers: “the right watch, the right car…clothing or living in the right neighborhood may help…offspring land the right job or the right contract” (Hill and Reeve 2005, p.401).  In short, if a lineage’s success depends on investing in highly competitive offspring, then it is predicted that fertility rates will decline.  Parents might reason that it is better to have one physician in the family over five waiters.
	This is not to endorse Hill and Reeve’s theory, which is provocative, but also speculative.  They offer no direct evidence that lineage success is enhanced by a decline in fertility in real human populations, and, in any case, it hardly seems like enough time has passed for an assessment; it would also be difficult to put their proposal through experimental testing.  Perhaps the explanation has nothing to do with raising either cultural or biological fitness, for example if lowered fertility is a side effect of women having expanded lifestyle choices.  All the same, a version of the clutch size hypothesis seems worthy of exploration after all.  The broader precedent set is that we might be overlooking explanations that are much less radical than exotic cultural mechanisms that somehow suppress biology.  Next, I will argue that it is even more clearly premature to conclude that kamikaze sacrifice supports cultural evolution. 
5.  EXPLAINING KAMIKAZES
Before continuing it is necessary to first dispense with a popular view that attempts to explain kamikaze behavior in terms of culture and belief.  The Japanese military upheld a traditional warrior code which encouraged the virtues of loyalty and honor, and when the occasion demanded, altruistic self-sacrifice.  It was thought that it was noble to die in battle, moreover religious beliefs about the afterlife probably contributed to impassivity about death.  There may well be something correct in this, and it at least is preferable to the non-explanation that kamikazes were simply insane human bombs.  As Boyd and Richerson (1985) point out, this view is also vacuous, since it doesn’t explain how the ancient samurai acquired their impassivity—it just pushes the explanatory problem back to an earlier generation, and it’s kamikazes all the way down.  
	Boyd and Richerson (and, following them, Sober) also reject a type-1 model.  Altruism can seem puzzling from within evolutionary theory: how can a trait evolve if it raises the fitness of others at one’s own expense?  Although altruism might seem self-defeating it can sometimes be explained through Darwinian mechanisms incorporating reciprocation: individuals who cooperate with each other can exchange favors and enjoy benefits inaccessible to narrowly egoistic partners for familiar reasons.  But the pilots knew they were going to die, so since there was no expectation that their favor would be returned, it is commonly assumed that reciprocal altruism is a non-starter.  Sober continues, “They died for their country.  Nor can one explain their self-sacrifice by saying that it was coerced by leaders; Kamikaze pilots volunteered” (Sober 1991/2006, p.542).  Sober then turns to a discussion of a mixed type-2/3 model.  Supposing a “special cultural transmission rule can allow a characteristic to evolve that could not evolve without it” he finds that “assumptions about cultural transmission lead to predictions that would not be true if a purely biological and non-cultural process were postulated” (Sober 1991/2006, p.545).  In short, he absorbs Boyd and Richerson’s claim that a culturally driven evolutionary process promises to offer a unique explanatory advantage.
	Why does Sober think it important to the assessment of cultural evolution that the pilots volunteered?  It is because cultural evolution contends that a trait is fit and infectious because it is psychologically attractive, usually because peers and role models had it first.  Recall that cultural models aim to vindicate the epidemic metaphor by assuming that possessing a “catchy” trait raises the probability that others will acquire it in accordance with the Acquisition Principle.  If this were not the case, then there would be no sense in speaking of the trait’s “fitness” or “heritability.”  Perhaps the cultural model needs to assume there was something appealing about being a kamikaze—the trait or meme was culturally fit and spread by either “mob appeal” or “snob appeal.”  This would commit the cultural theorist to the testable assumption that people volunteered or otherwise acted in accordance with their preferences.  Although there are ways to account for the cultural acquisition of traits that are unattractive—several models even incorporate coercion within transmission mechanisms, for now, let us limit our scope to hypotheses that assume volunteerism
With this in mind, the first thing to note is that even granting kamikazes died willingly we ought to stop to consider whether the type-1 model is being buried prematurely.  The point here is a central theme of Sober’s Unto Others, namely, that what looks like altruism from one perspective can turn out to be selfishness from another, and vice versa.  Two kinds of arguments are available: (I) If kamikazes are not genuinely altruistic (in the sense of self-sacrifice on behalf of non-kin), this can be explained by a type-1 (biological) model.  However (II) even if they are, this could be explained by a type-1 “error theory.”  These arguments require mindfulness about the three-part distinction between proximate psychological motives, behavior, and adaptive mechanisms, in that, for example, (II) is saying that genuinely altruistic behavior and motives could arise from a mechanism adapted for promoting non-genuinely altruistic behavior, but functioning within non-ancestral conditions.
While we might unreflectively assume that becoming a “Special Attack” pilot is straightforwardly deleterious, in fact the fitness effects are quite uncertain for both individuals and the Japanese Nation, and may well have been positive for the former and negative for the latter!  In light of this, standard Darwinian models of reciprocal and kin-directed altruism need to be more carefully considered.  For example, many explicitly saw themselves as reciprocating a lifetime’s worth of favors received from their countrymen (e.g. Axell and Kase 2002, pp.16, 40, 113).  But would a biological fitness perspective not demand defection, since the behavior did not plausibly confer long-term benefits?  While acknowledging official promises of reward in the afterlife, we can proceed on the assumption that few pilots took these claims seriously.  Yet as we shall see, joining a kamikaze squadron might have actually enhanced individual and inclusive fitness in a number of ways.  
Meanwhile, inclusive fitness depends on kin selection and occurs when the benefits of an altruistic trait are directed towards one’s near relatives, as illustrated by Haldane’s witticism that he would lay down his life for two siblings or eight cousins.  What is deleterious to the individual can be selected for anyway if it serves the “interests” of the genes shared between Haldane and his near relatives.  Sober and others discount this option because non-kin were the primary beneficiaries of the kamikaze trait.  Yet this is pure conjecture from the point of view of argument I.  It is far from clear that Japan fared better for having adopted such fanatical means of resistance.​[7]​  From the perspective of argument II, type-1 models do not claim that each and every current behavior is fitness raising—evolutionary psychology has long abandoned such an idea, and is only committed to saying that ancient mechanisms responsible for behavior (such as those promoting altruism) are adaptations—this is compatible with the misfiring of favor-returning or kin-favoring mechanisms.  In short, a type-1 model cannot reasonably be set aside if plausible biological mechanisms, especially for reciprocity and kin selection, can be used to help explain kamikazes, and possibly other instances of altruistic suicide.  There are a number of possibilities as to how biological adaptations could play a key role in structuring the pilots’ actions.  The explanation might invoke proximate or “ultimate” adaptive mechanisms.  For instance, perhaps pilots became kamikazes because they were psychologically motivated by love and affection for their immediate families.  Alternatively, even supposing the intended beneficiaries were Country and Emperor, perhaps this is in virtue of an adapted mechanism whose outcome is the promotion of their own families’ reproductive interests.  Finally, even in the absence of nepotistic motivation, or concrete assistance to kin, there could be a type-1 explanation positing a misfiring of a Darwinian adaptation for nepotism, much as a type-1 model plausibly explains our penchant for fatty foods and unhealthy sweets.  Each of these options needs to be considered before it is concluded that a cultural theory is favored over a type-1 theory.  I suspect that the most plausible type-1 model combines several of these elements including (1) a motive to help kin, (2) effects which helped kin, (3) the misfiring of adapted nepotistic mechanisms, and (4) various other psychologically manipulative “carrots and sticks.”​[8]​  Space does not permit an extended discussion of the evidence, but some examples drawn from Hill’s (2005) analysis of the kamikaze phenomenon are striking and suggestive.
6. KAMIKAZES DID NOT VOLUNTEER
As the war progressed, conventional air combat led to such heavy casualties that it was widely believed “none could realistically expect to survive” (Hill 2005, p.4).  Sometimes accidental collisions were officially described as acts of heroism (Inoguchi et al. 1958/1978).  Lost aircrews were replaced, not by volunteers, but by conscripted students.  Many of these elected to join the navy, and later became kamikazes, because it was thought that a quick death by air was preferable to a slow, agonizing, death by bullet wounds: “That he was to die in combat was taken as given” (Hill 2005, p.17).  Kamikaze missions proved to be more effective than conventional attacks (Hill 2005, p.10), so perhaps the doomed pilots adopted an attitude familiar to Westerners: “If I go down in Hell, thou art there also.”​[9]​  
Yet the first call for suicide pilots failed to attract even one graduate of the elite naval academy, though many others eventually signed on (2005 Hill, p.4).  However, in the abusive, totalitarian, military culture, a “request” was almost unheard of, and several pilots remember interpreting the call for volunteers as a direct order (Hill 2005, p.21).​[10]​  One witness recounts that sometimes “staff officers went ahead one-sidedly adding names” (Axell and Kase 2002, p.47), while another recalls that pilots were simply assigned to tokko (special attack) units (Ibid. p.114).  According to official sources, a departing pilot’s last words would often be “See you in Yasukuni shrine” in reference to the patriotic site devoted to emperor-worship and where war dead supposedly gathered as guardian spirits.  In contrast to official sources, a former pilot recollects things differently: “I never heard anyone saying that…they have scenes like that in movies…You think ‘bullshit!’” (quoted in Hill 2005, p.14).  The wavering commitment of many pilots was a problem, and it was common for them to return on dubious grounds (Axell and Kase 2002, p.69-70), with some apparently taking to extreme measures, such as ditching into the ocean (Ibid. p.74).  In a final gesture of defiance, one departing kamikaze even strafed the base commander’s quarters (Hill 2005, p.28). 
While I am committed to the claim that coercive aspects are an important part of the explanation, it is simultaneously plausible that mechanisms promoting kin favoritism and reciprocity were also involved.  Perhaps some found the prospect of becoming “god-heroes” celebrated in the press agreeable, as expected from normal variation in the temperament of human beings.  Tangible inducements, such as better food and accommodations, were also used to push recruits in the desired direction.  Naval uniforms were apparently also popular with the opposite sex, and there were even some instances in which women were procured for the gratification of kamikazes on their last night (Hill 2005, pp.24, 30).  Some of these incentives turned out to be counterproductive and had to be abandoned.  Military bureaucrats worried that training periods should be cut short so as to minimize the trainees’ exposure to “earthy pleasures,” as these weakened a pilot’s resolve—unsurprisingly, those based near sources of alcohol and women were more likely to abort their missions (Hill 2005, p.30).
Perhaps most tellingly, the pilots were also instructed that only a few of their number would be needed, so participation, though somewhat risky, strongly favored survival.  Apparently, less than a third of active kamikaze units were ordered to sally, and even then only a fraction of the pilots were required for any given mission.  Many out of this remainder often returned to base for any number of reasons, including poor weather, mechanical failure, or inability to find a suitable target (Axell and Kase, 2002: 113).  An individual’s prospects for survival could be quite good as when only 10 out of a unit’s 100 volunteers were used in attacks (Ibid. pp.154-5).  Especially considering the benefits, and given the narrowness of the recruits’ options, risking a 1-in-30 chance of death might not be such a bad bargain.  It is also not too hard to see how an evolved mechanism promoting suicidal heroism could promote fitness in small groups of near relatives.  Some compelling evidence supporting a kin selection model is the policy of granting posthumous two-rank promotions, which conferred enhanced survivors benefits onto the pilot’s family—these included access to scarce, desperately needed resources (e.g. food) and perhaps higher priority for other forms of support (Axell and Kase 2002, p.108).  
Although there is a good deal of ideological rhetoric to account for in the pilots’ (supervised and censored) farewell notes, some were quite blunt given the chance to express their true motives informally and, occasionally, in secret diaries.  One condemns “this rash and inhuman tactic” and does “not want to die for a man that calls himself Emperor!” (Nagatsuka quoted in Hill 2005, p.25).  Seki Yukio, the “first volunteer” was acting under orders, though he kept his doubts mostly to himself (Axell and Kase 2002, p.16).  In a moment of candor he remarked: “I am not going out for the Emperor or the Japanese Empire.  I am going for my beloved wife.  If Japan were defeated, I reckon she would be raped by American G.I.s.  I am dying to protect her” (Hill 2005, p.24).​[11]​  Hill contends that concern for family and country are strongly represented in the final poems and letters, though admittedly this judgment is impressionistic rather than quantitative.
With this issue in mind, Orbell and Morikawa (2011) performed an analysis of hundreds of documents left by kamikazes obtained from various sources, comparing their sentiments to those of other fallen soldiers of the Japanese military.  They offer a type-1 evolutionary explanation differing from the ones I introduced in that it does not incorporate coercion.  Instead, they posit an evolved cognitive algorithm such that people willingly extend kin-based self-sacrifice to non-kin if they are members of a coalition of allied kin-groups that is under dire threat.  Ethnocentric and jingoist tendencies are explicable, even expected, features of typical human societies.  Warfare arguably depends on “aggression, risk taking, male bonding, ingroup altruism, outgroup xenophobia, dominance and subordination, and territoriality all of which are encoded in the human genome” (Pitman, 2010).  Their proposal accordingly mixes reciprocal altruism and kin-based altruism for different selective units.  At the level of kin-groups it is beneficial to participate in coalitions for mutual advantage.  Meanwhile, within a specific kin-group, altruistic tendencies can be selected for their effects on inclusive fitness.  Pinker’s suggestion that humans evolved to regard larger social groupings as honorary kin could also be relevant.  Ethnic groups are quite literally extended families “[t]hough in a modern ethnic group the family ties are too distant for kin-based altruism to be significant, this was not true of the smaller coalitions in which we evolved.  Even today ethnic groups often perceive themselves as large families” (Pinker 2002, p.323).
Of course, merely apprehending others as reciprocators is not the same as actually receiving benefits.  And even if there were advantages to entering a suicide pact, wouldn’t it be rational to defect when the time comes for self-sacrifice?  There are several replies to these doubts, the first of which again invokes the distinction between behaviors and adaptive mechanisms.  We can also acknowledge that the problem isn’t unique to kamikazes since it is always better to defect in situations where one can escape punishment.  If such cases are rare, perhaps mechanisms for promoting reciprocity are fairly course-grained and don’t promote stealthy defections even when this would be optimal.  Further, it is unlikely that reciprocity was ever the pilots’ sole motivation, and it probably tended to be supplemented by concern for family, and, coercion.  Pilots’ statements about reciprocity probably expressed secondary motives serving to rationalize and support those primary motives.  Again, a mechanism for promoting solidarity within a kin group could also “misfire” in non-ancestral environments (much as a chick can imprint on a human, a pilot could come to feel solidarity towards an individual to whom he is unrelated).  Finally, though several thousand pilots followed through, some did defect.  Recall the evidence that perhaps only 3% of the volunteers were even asked to sally; For a suicide pact this is pretty good odds even before we consider those who returned to base on suspicious pretexts.  But why didn’t they all defect?  This is a fair question, but again adaptive mechanisms for promoting motivations to reciprocate can be maladaptive in non-ancestral contexts.  Also, if successful kamikazes compose such a small subpopulation, this concedes kamikaze “volunteers” overall do not pose a challenge to biological models. 
Turning back to Orbell and Morikawa’s hypothesis, while it has some appeal it is not the only explanation of their data.​[12]​  This is because they make two contentious assumptions.  First, they discount the suggestion that the pilots were coerced because they find no mention of it in the hundreds of materials they examined (2011, p.12).  This is reinforced by the finding of constant declarations of loyalty to the Emperor and the Nation, and the fact that pilots were asked not ordered.  Second, they also assume that coercion would rule out an explanation couched in terms of type-1 adaptations (2011, p.12).  However, both of these claims are questionable.  
Concerning the first point Orbell and Morikawa may have approached their materials with too much credulity.  Although they acknowledge that the filtering and framing by military censors should make reference to coercion less frequent, they nevertheless take it at face value that they found absolutely no mention of threats or pressures (2011, p.13 table 1).  As we are talking about conscripts in a totalitarian system where we already know there was large measure of coercion in daily life, this is very surprising.  Shouldn’t the conscripts complain a little about their predicament?  That this doesn’t happen at all in the supervised letters is therefore a dog that didn’t bark.  Moreover, as I have said, heavily supervised and censored notes are not the only sources of information.  When they had the means to express themselves more freely, the pilots tended to drop the party line.  As for the commanders’ post-war testimony that only the willing had been utilized, Orbell and Morikawa (2011, p.12) concede these accounts are untrustworthy.  Even in the recollection they quote, the leader states pointedly that “you are all willing to die” before adding he intends to monitor who “volunteered” and who didn’t.  
Meanwhile, their second point about coercion raises a puzzle.  Recall that Sober and others assumed volunteerism weighs against a type-1 model.  Now Orbell and Morikawa claim the reverse—a strictly biological explanation actually requires that the pilots did not act under duress!  So why do both sides wish to emphasize volunteerism?  It is presumably because there is no need to posit an adaptive mechanism—be it cultural or biological—in order to explain behavior that was compelled.  But why so readily dismiss the possibility that it took a lot of pressure to convince conscripts in a military dictatorship to kill themselves for a lost cause?  It seems somewhat plausible that the State exploited psychological mechanisms promoting kin selection with partial success.  Grade-school texts urged the extension of filial piety to the emperor, e.g. “The whole country is one great family, and the Imperial House is the Head family” (quoted in Hill 2005 p.16).  Then again, this doesn’t mean people believed it!  Other writings left by the conscripted students, including secret diaries, indicate that most failed to become fully indoctrinated, although their skepticism flagged as the homeland itself came under threat (Hill 2005, p.17).  But individual suicide pilots certainly were physically threatened and psychologically manipulated.  As already mentioned beatings were used to enforce discipline (Hill 2005, p.20) and, on at least one occasion, a pilot who returned too many times was shot (Ohnuki-Tierney 2006).  Peer pressure was used to enforce conformity, as it was considered dishonorable, weak, and unmanly, to refuse one’s duty (Hill 2005, p.26).  Finally, ephedrine (anti-sleep tablets) was administered to increase aggression, alertness, and perhaps recklessness (Axell and Kase 2002, p.56; Owen 2007, p.84).
In short, there is considerable evidence that the popular view that people happily volunteered to die on behalf of the Japanese Empire is grossly in error.  The unwilling faced death whether or not they served as kamikazes.  The military’s stewardship of their young draftees was brutish, though they also provided incentives to help ensure obedience.  Nevertheless, there were serious concerns about their reliability, and worries that delays would lead to an unraveling of their weak commitment.  Presumably many or most pilots were conflicted; some resisted only in thought, others in deed.  At one point, even Orbell and Morikawa acknowledge there had to be a mixture of factors, including coercion (2011, p.14).  They also found kamikazes were two times as likely as other soldiers to mention the war effort or saving family (Orbell and Morikawa 2011, p.13 table 1).  To the degree that there was voluntary participation, it was often in virtue of nepotistic concern (apt and inapt), and may even have been a wise gamble, given the alternatives.  But to the extent that pilots on the whole did not freely volunteer undercuts the rationale for Orbell and Morikawa’s specific type-1 hypothesis.  Admittedly, there could be a more complex picture in which their proposed mechanism plays a part.
Where does this leave cultural evolution?  This critique also undermines the claim that the kamikaze trait (or meme) hopped person-to-person specifically because of its attractiveness or popularity.  This “best case” scenario depends on assuming that the sacrifice was willing.  But what if it was not willing?
7.  HOW DOES COERCION FIT INTO MODELS OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION?
One lesson I drew from the previous section is that what looks to be a case of learning and imitation might not be.  Kamikaze proliferation didn’t occur by a process of “horizontal” transmission (where the trait spread by imitation from peer-to-peer).  Rather it seemed to spread mostly by way of a certain kind of coercive top-down process.  Certainly, cultural theorists contend that the transmission of cultural traits can also transpire “obliquely” by way of unrelated high-status non-peers, who in this case were the military commanders and senior pilots.  It is also not unfamiliar for cultural models to include coercion, such as peer pressure, as a mechanism for enforcing group norms (Baum et al. 2004, Boyd and Richerson 1992, Sperber and Claidière 2006).  Hence some of what I’ve argued is compatible with a cultural transmission process.  In short, the rejoinder goes, it shouldn’t really matter whether the pilots were willing or unwilling, so long as the trait propagated through the population.  However, the critical point is that mere compatibility is a far cry from the claim that cultural evolution presents an “irresistible” framework.  In addition, the kind of cultural coercion in question seems to make for a poor fit with the epidemic metaphor and the Acquisition Principle.
To better see why the issue of coercion matters, it will be helpful to be reminded once more of the distinction between (A) adaptive mechanisms, (B) proximate psychological motives, and (C) behavior.  Boyd and Richerson (and Sober) are committed to the view that kamikazes were genuinely altruistic in senses B and C.​[13]​  Sober (1991/2006, p.542) mentions he and Boyd and Richerson chose this example specifically because kamikazes’ motives were altruistic.  Since there was no expectation of reciprocity, the issue of coercion matters: can cultural factors swamp psychological dispositions, replacing selfishly directed motives with ones that are altruistic? 
If kamikazes were coerced this is evidence against genuine altruism in sense B.  One reason this matters is because while the application of B to kamikazes is a “textbook” example it is never challenged.  A more important reason is because if the kamikazes were not psychologically motivated by genuine altruism, then there is no pressure to seek a cultural model to understand their behavior.  If I absent-mindedly put a quarter in your laundry machine, my behavior is genuinely altruistic, but poses no puzzle to a biological understanding of human action.  The same goes if I am coerced into that behavior.  Meanwhile, if I knowingly and willingly act altrustically, this might seem to call for an explanation that does not involve adaptive, fitness-enhancing mechanisms. 
Coercion might be part of a transmission regime for certain kinds of cases, such as policing defections in prisoner’s dilemmas where “altruistic punishment” is used to enforce cooperation (Boyd et al. 2003).  In this kind of case the Acquisition Principle is satisfied: Having the trait enhances the tendency for others to acquire it.  But this won’t work for the kamikaze example.  The upshot of the kamikaze volunteerism myth isn’t merely that the transmission pattern was vertical.  It is not a question of the source of transmission, but rather how the trait came to be more frequent, and whether this is best explained in terms of a cultural analogue to some evolutionary process, such as one recruiting concepts like fitness and inheritance.
The idea of being a kamikaze was never appealing, and hardly ever “transmitted” at all in the sense of being passed from one person to the next.  Peer pressure also doesn’t explain the initial acquisition of the trait—recall that to explain the acquisition of rare traits Boyd and Richerson fall back on the influence of high status role models.  But this won’t work when it comes to kamikazes—the leaders weren’t suicide bombers, and didn’t set any example; so e.g. an imitative process would have only spread the idea that somebody else should die on behalf of the cause.  Perhaps there is some other way of explaining how having the trait raised the probability that others would acquire it, but there doesn’t seem to be any explanatory gain in doing so.  This is because kamikaze behavior was not strictly in virtue of the fitness or transmission of the idea of self-sacrifice for the State.  The military authorities couldn’t transmit a trait they didn’t themselves possess: They only believed it was good for other people to be kamikazes.  As the conscripts already possessed this trait, it had to be suppressed!  Put otherwise, it is as if the kamikaze trait was only “projected” onto the population, and when the source “switched off” (when the war ended) the students immediately stopped being kamikazes and resumed their lives. This suggests there are two kinds of coercion.  There are instances where a trait spreads because “carriers” compel individuals to conform.  Then there are cases where they are under the control of “noncarriers.”  It stands to reason that the last scenario might well be the most commonplace. 
But even if these issues with transmission and inheritance can be clarified, there remains a fundamental difficulty.  Given that a type-1 model (or, an explanation that doesn’t invoke selection in any sense) is still on the table, examples of extreme altruism cannot be used as evidence for a special cultural population process.  It is simply unknown what effect a kamikaze suicide pact has on a pilot’s inclusive fitness—even if snap intuition suggests it was deleterious.  Perhaps kamikaze behavior results from a selected mechanism for coalitional altruism as suggested by Orbell and Morikawa, though I suggested it more likely results from a combination of coercion and behaviors arising out of mechanisms for reciprocity and kin altruism, at times possibly interacting with certain false beliefs, e.g. that the nation is part of one’s family.​[14]​  Or perhaps for some it was kin selection without illusions—if I am going to die anyway, why not in a blaze of glory that will leave enhanced veteran’s benefits to my family?  Or in light of how they were manipulated, perhaps a specifically evolutionary explanation is unnecessary.  These alternatives have not been (and may never be) ruled out.  Again: merely showing that the trait propagated isn’t sufficient, since it also needs to be shown that there is no plausible alternative explanation.  
8. CONCLUSION
It is an unquestioned dogma that kamikazes volunteered, doing so incurred a fitness penalty, and that this is evidence favoring a cultural population process.  Yet the decision to engage in self-sacrifice was not easily elicited from the conscripted students and required a suite of pressures, techniques, and policies.  That they did not chose to die counts against theories that explain cultural transmission in terms of a behavior’s attractiveness.  These attest to the trait’s unfitness.  The sticking point concerns heredity.  Since the kamikaze trait didn’t spread from one individual to the next, this illustrates that understanding stability and change in populations exhibiting extreme altruism need not call for cultural evolution.  
The intentional and institutionalized manipulation of individuals by other human beings is assuredly evidence of the workings of culture in some innocent sense.  Nor is this to deny that humans have evolved dispositions to imitate each other.  But this is not the same as establishing that there is such a thing as cultural evolution, that cultural analogues to “fitness” and “heredity” are explanatory, or that the Acquisition Principle is satisfied.  Pilots had to be coerced by those who did not posses the kamikaze trait, and having it did not appear to raise the probability that others would acquire it.  This aside, even to the extent that the behavior was attractive, standard Darwinian mechanisms offer plausible models.  Perhaps these are the wrong constraints, but whatever the population process consists in, it will need to be shown that it can work against biological fitness.  Becoming a kamikaze has complex causes, some of which may be explicable as fitness enhancing and some not.  The bare fact that a trait spreads despite a tendency to lower fitness of the individual organism is not prima facie evidence of cultural evolution. 
While it would make for a weak inductive base if one were to attempt a generalization about all instances of altruism, this is (emphatically) not to assume biology explains kamikazes, (or altruistic self-sacrifice in general), though this continues to be an open possibility.  Consider the demographic profile of Palestinian suicide bombers, who overwhelmingly tended to be young childless males (Ricolfi 2005, p.105).  Recruiters avoided selecting an only child, and pairs of volunteers who were closely related (Elster 2005, p.244).  There is an adaptive logic that makes this unsurprising; Evolution predicts unattached young men will tend to adopt reckless behavior more often than others (see Buss 1994, p.201 who cites Wilson and Daly’s 1984).  But it’s compatible with the present argument that culture is autonomous (or explanatorily irreducible) in the weaker sense that cultural phenomena, at least sometimes, demand explanations involving distinctively cultural concepts (e.g. political, religious or ideological).  However, the case for saying that a special cultural mode of evolution can override biology ought not draw on the myth of the kamikaze. 
Kamikazes do not pose a baffling challenge to a biological understanding of human behavior.  The kamikaze phenomenon does not favor a cultural hypothesis over a non-cultural hypothesis.  When we examine the details, we find they do not support what the champions of cultural models have been saying about suicidal altruism.  This ought to make us wary about other examples!  However, very well documented case studies of suicidal altruism are hard to come by: We don’t have long-term fitness data (for kin groups), and experimental manipulations are out of the question.  The deflationary alternative also has the advantage of parsimony. 
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^1	  “The genes hold culture on a leash.  The leash is very long, but inevitably values will be constrained in accordance with their effects on the human gene pool” Wilson (1975, p.167).
^2	  Pinker (p.876) remarks: “many group selectionists…write as if…kamikaze attacks…and other forms of voluntary martyrdom have long been the norm in human conflict” and Morin (2016, p.90) notes it is one of Boyd and Richerson’s “most widely quoted examples.”  More recently Richerson and Boyd (2008, p.216) reassert their commitment to psychological altruism in writing that “suicide bombers give their lives to further their cause.”  Bowles and Ginitis (2011, p.10) treat it as a textbook case, writing that kamikazes are one of several “dramatic examples that people are often motivated by non-selfish principles.”  
^3	  An informal sense in which ideas replicate has infected ordinary language (e.g. videos “going viral” on YouTube) although orthodox evolutionary theory would dismiss this as merely colorful metaphor.  A meme is supposed to be a cultural unit of selection, though the concept is notoriously fuzzy—memes encompass such diverse things as songs, words, theories, fads, jokes, and technologies.  Meme theory is seriously under developed.  What exactly is replicating? What does it mean to say that a meme is fit?  The meme-meme itself hints at an answer: it is French for “same,” connotes memory, and has assonance with “gene,” and so invokes the idea of replication in multiple ways (de Sousa, 2004).  While pithy, to say a meme is fit because it is catchy, or because it is easily associated is a non-explanation.  Whether these difficulties are fatal is a matter of debate.  Biological evolution also needed time to mature, and was worthy of scientific investigation even before it was known what served as replicators, or how transmission mechanisms worked (Mesoudi et al., 2004).
^4	  Sober conceives of a trait’s cultural heritability (e.g. the belief that one should be a kamikaze) in terms of learning (e.g. by imitation, indoctrination, or whatever).
^5	  Sober doesn’t consider other possible cultural modes, such as the idea that the objects of a selection process could be cultural units, e.g. memes, instead of biological individuals.  This raises the problem of distinguishing traits from units, though it will not be explored here. 
^6	  There are no known cases of female kamikazes, although civilians did often commit suicide in order to evade capture. Perhaps this is understandable given Japanese propaganda promoting the belief that women would be raped and men would be tortured.  For soldiers, attempted surrender was also forbidden under penalty of execution (Hill 2005, p.20).
^7	  Though I am agnostic as to how much the kamikaze strategy contributed to the Allied decision to devastate major urban areas.  This might have occurred anyway, for a number of reasons—such as LeMay’s determination to vindicate the B-29 program (Hastings, 2008).
^8	  As the pilots shared more genes with their countrymen than with their enemy, Haldane’s logic just might possibly be extended to rationalize self-sacrifice on behalf of millions of distant relatives.  Of course, it would not have been reasonable for a pilot to expect that his solitary death could save the lives of countless Japanese, all on its own.   However, as 1000 Haldanes could save 8000 cousins, or 32000 second cousins, and so on, the logic of kin selection might somehow still apply to the collective actions of small numbers.  Japanese propaganda constantly reminded the people that heroic special missions could persuade the Americans to negotiate an end to the war, and so prevent the catastrophe of an invasion. 
^9	  Though this isn’t what the author of Psalms 139:8 had in mind.
^10	  In other words they were “voluntold.”
^11	  Seki returned to base four times having failed to locate a suitable target, though on the fifth day his unit succeeded in sinking an escort carrier, the St. Lo, and damaging two others (Inoguchi et al. 1978, p.56).
^12	   Honor and beauty were mentioned even more often than Emperor and country (Orbell and Morikawa 2011, pp.13, 17) – is there a special evolved rule about that as well?  
^13	  As before, by “genuinely” I mean the self-sacrificing motive or behavior is directed towards the fitness of non-kin).  
^14	  An old anecdote about dolphins "attempting to rescue” a dead shark comes to mind.
